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I.  Introduction 
 
Global banks expanded their international activities over their past decade, with this expansion 
interrupted by the Great Recession. The consequences of this increased internationalization of 
banking have been debated. One dimension of the debate focuses on the advantages and 
disadvantages of banks from more developed financial systems having expanded and sometimes 
dominant positions in emerging market economies. Banking globalization can lead to 
institutional and regulatory or supervisory improvements, which promote “strong property rights 
and a financial system that directs capital to its most productive uses [which] are crucial to 
achieving high economic growth and the eradication of poverty” (Mishkin 2009). 
1 When shocks 
originate within the emerging markets, foreign bank entry into local banking systems is a 
stabilizing force. It also results in more efficient allocation of productive resources in globalized 
economies [see survey by Goldberg (2009)].  
Yet, international banking linkages are viewed as having spread the profound difficulties 
from the financial crisis that began in industrialized countries in 2007. The dramatic changes in 
capital flows to emerging markets are cited as evidence for such concerns (Chart 1). After a 
period of strong growth through 2007, capital inflows contracted across Emerging Asia, Latin 
America, and Emerging Europe. The initial boom was across multiple forms of private 
international capital flows (Chart 2), covering foreign direct investment, bank loans, portfolio 
equity, and net debt securities. While the subsequent reversal was in all broad categories of 
inflows, by far the sharpest decline in activity was in international bank loans.  After rising to 
over $500 billion in 2007, international bank loans dropped to slightly above $100 billion in 
2008. Such observations prompted the International Monetary Fund’s April 2009 World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) to argue that global bank linkages “fuel the fire” of the current crisis 
to emerging markets (page 149). 
In this paper we provide a conceptual and econometric examination of the international 
transmission of the balance sheet shocks that pummeled industrialized-country banks. We 
conjecture the existence of multiple channels of transmission of the original shock through the 
                                                 
1 See also the discussion by Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001) and by Calomiris and Powell (2001).   
Additionally, globalization of banking weakens the lending channel for monetary policy within the United States, 
while extending the transmission of U.S. policy and liquidity shocks to foreign markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 
2008). The home market shocks are transmitted into the lending of foreign affiliates.  At the same time, such internal 
capital markets mean that foreign bank subsidiaries do not need to rein in their credit supply during a (local) 
financial crisis at the same time that domestically-owned banks need to (De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2009).  . 2 
 
operations of global banks. Using bilateral lending data covering cross-border lending and local 
claims between countries, as well as data from destination emerging markets, we identify the 
magnitude and consequences of respective channels of transmission through international banks. 
To achieve this goal, we isolate loan demand from loan supply shocks, both of which contributed 
to the patterns shown in Chart 2, adapting an econometric methodology recently utilized by 
Khwaja and Mian (2008). Controlling for loan demand shocks is important, since the crisis also 
induced declines in home investment, home consumption, and international trade.
2  
In Section II we use the heuristic of T-accounts for bank balance sheets to show that the 
loan supply effects through global banks and international capital markets take three different 
forms. The intuition begins with the observation that changes in the sources of funds available to 
banks initiate a lending supply response (Kashyap and Stein 2000). The sources differ for global 
banks and domestically-owned banks in emerging markets. The external capital market of all 
banks in emerging markets includes local deposits, other host market sources, and cross-border 
interbank borrowing. Banks that are part of a broader organization, for example a global bank 
holding company, may also receive funding from related affiliates, with such resources falling 
under the heading of internal capital market funding.
3 Both external and internal capital markets 
play roles in the international transmission of shocks.  
In a crisis, a foreign-owned bank hit by an adverse liquidity shock may reduce its cross-
border lending. If this bank has overseas affiliates, it may also activate an internal capital market 
channel, reducing funding to affiliates abroad or actively transferring foreign funds in support to 
the head office balance sheet. The foreign-owned banks are not the only entities that may reduce 
lending in emerging markets. Domestically-owned banks may rely on external capital markets 
                                                 
2 The dramatic collapse of global trade in goods and services during the crisis has spawned a debate about the 
reasons for this collapse. Comparative facts on the downturn are provided by Imbs (2010).  Some studies posit that 
banking and trade credit disruptions played a key role (Amiti and Weinstein, 2009; Chor and Manova 2009). Other 
studies dispute the central role of trade credit, instead arguing that global demand and the expanded role of vertically 
integrated production account for most of the observed collapse of trade (Eaton, Kortum et al. 2009, Yi, Bems, and 
Johnson 2010, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar 2009), or that the collapse was a manifestation of an inventory 
adjustment (Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan 2010). 
3 Internal capital markets have received earlier attention in domestic banking contexts.  For example, Houston, 
Marcus, and James (1997) emphasize active internal capital markets in banking organizations, with banks relying on 
related entities in a bank holding company to get insulation from localized shocks within the United States.   
Likewise, Ashcraft (2008) shows that bank holding companies are a source of strength to their affiliates, while 
Campello (2002) shows that parent bank insulation from access to external capital markets extends to small 
affiliated banks, leaving them less vulnerable to shocks than other small banks that are unaffiliated. See also 
Ashcraft and Campello (2007). The application to global banks by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008, 2009) argues that 
there is often internal borrowing and lending between parent organizations and their overseas affiliates. Correa and 
Murry (2009) consider the cross-border lending dynamics. 3 
 
for funding local activities, with cross-border interbank borrowing being one of these external 
sources. Hence, domestically-owned banks also could end up with a balance sheet shock that 
reduces their own lending capacity. Indeed, the external capital markets of small host country 
banks can be quite volatile, leading to lending activity that is hostage to the boom and bust 
features of cross-border lending.  Ex ante, however, it cannot be concluded that domestically-
owned banks operating in emerging markets will necessarily be more stable or effective lenders 
in those markets than the foreign banks that have entered over the past decades.  Which of these 
respective channels are larger in emerging markets is an empirical question. 
In Section III we provide the econometric analysis of the bank lending channel in 
emerging markets, focusing on mechanics at work during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. 
Our methodology, an adaptation of Khwaja and Mian (2008), uses a difference-in-difference 
approach to isolate loan demand from loan supply in a matrix of lending between 17 developed 
source and 94 emerging market destination countries across Asia, Latin America, and Europe. 
Three types of lending are considered:  cross-border loans, local loans extended by foreign-
owned banks, and local loans extended by domestically-owned banks.  
We find evidence of substantial lending supply shocks to emerging markets through all 
three balance sheet channels conjectured ex ante. Foreign banks that were particularly affected 
by the original liquidity shock to their balance sheet, cut both cross-border lending and local 
lending growth to emerging markets. Transmission through external capital markets was strong 
for both foreign-owned and domestically-owned banks.  The loan supply contraction by 
domestically-owned banks was not attributable to their reliance on cross-border funding sources 
per se.  Instead, the contraction was greater for those countries that had more cross-border 
funding from banking systems that were ex ante more imbalanced.
4 
Section IV concludes with a discussion of related policy themes.  We argue that cross-
border lending and internal capital markets are both conduits for international shock 
transmission, both positive and negative. However, these features do not imply that closed or 
reduced access to international capital markets is welfare-improving for emerging markets.  
 
                                                 
4 Our approach focuses on transmission channels as a result of existing bilateral ties between source and destination 
countries. A complementary take is to look at potential “contagion” effects, so that transmission occurs also through 
“third” country channels. van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) find evidence of significant transmission of shocks 
through such channels. 4 
 
II. A Brief Primer on Internal and External Capital Markets and Bank Balance Sheets 
 
What can a bank do when confronted with a shock to its balance sheet? Alternative 
responses to a liquidity shock can be illustrated using a simplified version of bank balance 
sheets. The generic bank T-account has bank assets on the left side of the T and bank liabilities 
on the right side.  In broad terms, bank liabilities are divided into deposits, other funds, and bank 
capital; bank assets are divided into liquid assets and less liquid assets such as loans extended to 
bank customers.   
Prior research describes how a contraction in available liquidity, for example through a 
decline in a bank’s reservable deposits, has distinct consequences across types of banks, such as 
small stand-alone banks, small banks affiliated with larger bank holding companies, and larger 
banks (Kashyap and Stein 2000; Campello 2002). A contractionary monetary policy that reduces 
the amount of reservable deposits (or other shock to bank funds) can translate into a reduction in 
bank lending activity when banks are unable to replace each dollar of lost deposits with other 
liabilities.  The reduced liabilities will lead to a combination of reduced liquid assets and reduced 
lending.  Larger banks or bank holding companies can either be domestically oriented or have 
operations spread across global markets. In the international context, balance sheet effects 
incorporate international transmission through internal capital markets and are statistically and 
economically important (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2008). International transmission also occurs 
through cross-border flows by global banks, even those without overseas branches and affiliates. 
The transmission of policy and liquidity shocks through U.S. bank cross-border flows has been 
statistically and economically significant: a significant reduction in the level of cross-border 
claims occurs during periods of U.S. monetary tightening, pointing to the existence of a cross-
border lending channel (Correa and Murry 2009).  
  These themes are illustrated in Box 1 using the T-account framework applied to banks 
lending to emerging markets. Consider two types of banks: a global bank with an affiliate 
operating within an emerging market and a domestically-owned bank. The top panel presents the 
global bank balance sheets, distinguishing between those of the parent bank balance sheet and 
the affiliate.  The parent bank has assets divided into liquid assets, loans in the home market, and 
cross-border loans. Given an initial adverse shock to liabilities through deposits or other sources 
of funds, the global bank can respond by trying to replace this liquidity in external capital 
markets. If this is not sufficient (or desirable), the bank can engage in some form of lending 5 
 
contraction, reducing loan issuance at home or cross-border flows to foreign markets. Some 
balance sheet pressures can be alleviated if the parent organization borrows liquidity from 
overseas affiliates, i.e., through internal capital markets. Such borrowing may mitigate the 
liquidity shock consequences in the home market of the parent bank (Cetorelli and Goldberg 
2008) or even cross-border loans. However, the internal capital market transfer changes the 
balance sheet of the affiliate firm, leading to adjustments that might lead to a reduction of local 
lending by that affiliate if other adjustments to affiliate bank assets or liabilities are not 
forthcoming.  The cross-border loan supply contraction and the contraction in affiliate lending 
are two possible forms of parent bank transmission to emerging markets. 
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source of funds. It is possible that deposits move between the domestically-owned banks and the 
foreign affiliates, but the direction of these flows is not straight-forward to predict. Without 
access to offsetting alternative funding sources, the loans extended by the domestically-owned 
bank might contract in line with the reduced availability of cross-border funds.  This illustrates a 
third channel through which there can be international transmission of shocks into the loan 
supply to emerging markets.   
 
III. Bank Funding and Lending Volatility in the Financial Crisis 
 
The econometric analysis explores the scale and existence of these three channels of 
transmission of global bank shocks to emerging market economies in the crisis beginning in 
2007. A priority in this analysis is isolating contractions in loan supply from those in loan 
demand. Below, we present the econometric methodology, discuss the main data sources, and 
conclude with the empirical findings. 
 
III. 1 The econometric methodology 
Our goal is to assess to what extent the balance sheet shocks suffered by banks in many 
developed countries during the financial crisis determined a corresponding shock to their supply 
of 1) cross-border loans to emerging economies and 2) local loans from their offices located in 
emerging market countries. Additionally, we want to assess the potential impact on the supply of 
loans by domestic banks in emerging markets, and the extent that the retreat in cross-border 
lending corresponded to a shock to domestic bank funding sources.  
The empirical implementation presents important and well known identification 
challenges. In particular, it requires showing that if banks are affected by a shock to their funding 
sources, their ultimate response is to accommodate such shock with an equivalent adjustment in 
their lending activity. However, as our section II exposition of bank balance sheets shows, this 
accommodation of lending does not need to occur: banks may be able to substitute away from 
adversely shocked funding sources into other, more readily available ones. Moreover, even in the 
presence of imperfect substitution on the liability side of the balance sheet, banks may still be 
able to insulate lending activity by absorbing the liability shock with a corresponding change in 
available liquid asset buffers.  7 
 
Moreover, establishing the existence of a bank lending channel also requires the 
identification of an effective lending supply shock, separate from potential contamination by 
concomitant changes in credit demand conditions.  Recall from Chart 2 the substantial drop in 
international bank lending to emerging markets in the aftermath of the crisis. This decline in 
lending is not evidence per se of a loan supply shock. The same decline could have also been 
observed if banks had been able to insulate their lending books from the original liquidity shock 
– either through funding substitution and/or utilization of existing liquid asset buffers – and yet 
firms, simultaneously hit on current product demand or on their future investment opportunities, 
may have simply reduced overall loan demand. Given the extent of the crisis and the after-the-
fact impact on global GDP growth, we cannot exclude a priori this alternative explanation.  
In a recent paper, Khwaja and Mian (2008) propose a simple but elegant identification 
strategy that very effectively isolates a lending supply shock around a well-defined funding 
shock on banks’ balance sheets.
5  The authors focused their attention on bank lending activity in 
Pakistan around the time of an exogenous macroeconomic shock that occurred in 1998 as a result 
of nuclear testing by India and Pakistan. In this episode, capital controls were imposed in 
response, generating a shock on dollar-denominated deposits and a resulting quasi natural 
experiment that Khwaja and Mian (2008) exploited to assess the extent of both the bank lending 
channel and the ultimate impact on firm borrowings.
6 The authors relied heavily on the fact that 
the liquidity shock was not felt homogeneously across banks, since ex ante not all Pakistani 
banks had built similar levels of dollar-denominated liabilities. Moreover, the authors took 
advantage of the fact that many firms had been borrowing simultaneously from more than one 
bank; hence, firm funding sources were heterogeneously affected. In light of this set of 
                                                 
5 Schnabl (2009) provides another recent example of loan supply shock identification. He uses the 1998 Russian 
default as a negative credit supply shock to international banks and analyzes its impact on bank lending in Peru. 
With data on individual firms, he controls for credit demand by examining firms that borrow from several banks. 
6 In retaliation to unanticipated nuclear tests in India in May 1998, Pakistan followed through in a matter of days 
with its own nuclear tests. As a result of such tests, both countries were promptly sanctioned by the international 
community, with the suspension of exchange rate support to the Pakistani rupee as part of the sanction package. This 
chain of events, unrelated to the functioning of the Pakistani banking industry, ultimately resulted in a severe bank 
liquidity crunch, since many Pakistani banks had a substantial deposit base in dollar-denominated accounts. The 
dollars collected through these bank deposits, however, had to be transferred to the government, which upon 
withdrawal requests from bank clients would eventually release such dollars at the exchange rate at the time of the 
original deposit. In essence, the government bore all the currency risk on bank deposits. In response to the financial 
sanctions cited above, the Pakistani government announced the suspension of this convertibility agreement, 
releasing instead dollars at the current, much devalued exchange rate, effectively imposing a partial default on this 
liability. Despite the much less favorable conditions, a substantial amount of dollars were withdrawn by depositors, 
thus determining a severe funding crisis for the Pakistani banking system. 8 
 
conditions, Khwaja and Mian (2008) modeled the change in the growth of lending supply by an 
array of individual banks vis-à-vis an array of firms to which they make loans. This informative 
difference-in-difference approach facilitates isolation of loan supply versus loan demand effects. 
        At  least  from  the  perspective  of  a natural experiment design, the characteristics of our 
empirical study have strong similarities to those in Khawja and Mian (2008). The recent 
financial crisis mainly originated as a sudden and exceptional shortage of dollar funding on the 
balance sheet of banks in many developed economies, the result of previous large build ups of 
dollar denominated assets from structured products that in the summer of 2007 became virtually 
unmarketable (see, e.g., Coffey, Hrung, Nguyen, and Sarkar 2009). Bank funding problems 
eventually mounted in the following months, and with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy event in 
September 2008, dollar funding sources for banks effectively froze across the board. Ex ante 
vulnerability to dollar funding was significantly heterogeneous across banks, and, when 
aggregated to the country level, also significantly heterogeneous across banking systems. Similar 
to Khwaja and Mian (2008), the original balance sheet shock was felt differently across banking 
systems.  These differences created associated balance sheet shocks and the potential lending 
supply shocks to differ across countries that previously had been a common source of funding to 
emerging market economies.  
Going back to Khwaja and Mian (2008), the derived lending supply schedule in terms of 
(log) changes from before to after the shock is
7 
 01 1 ij i j ij LD        
In their article, the dimension i represented individual banks, and j individual borrowing firms. 
   is a constant term, Δ   the indicator of the liquidity shock sustained by bank i, and    an 
unobservable term capturing simultaneous shocks to firm j credit demand. The term ∆    
captures the change in lending from before to after the event, and banks that were hit more by the 
liquidity shock should be those that reduce more (or grow less) their lending. As shown by 
Khawja and Mian, specification (1) as estimated with basic OLS would likely generate biased 
estimates of    
  because of a correlation with simultaneous demand shocks embedded in the 
unobservable term   . In normal circumstances, for instance, one would expect a simultaneous 
reduction in credit demand when there is a liquidity shock, so that not taking this effect into 
                                                 
7 We defer to the original Khwaja and Mian (2008) article for the details of the model. 9 
 
account would lead to an over-estimate of the true supply shock.
8  However, introducing 
borrowers’ fixed effects on model specification (1) would absorb any demand driven 
contamination thus resolving the bias problem affecting the OLS estimation. Consequently, the 
alternative model specification for estimation is 
 1 2 ij i j ij LD     
with     now unbiased and    being a vector of fixed effect coefficients. In essence, this 
alternative model specification achieves identification comparing the impact on lending of 
separate banks i to the same firm j. Under the less stringent assumption that the same firm uses 
multiple banks to obtain similar type of loans, any common shock on demand factors would not 
affect the identification of the supply effect.  
In our study, we use data on the aggregate international lending activity (cross border 
claims and local claims) of developed countries i to emerging market economies j. We rely on 
the fact that the banking systems of the lending countries had built up significantly different 
degrees of reliance on dollar-denominated liabilities, and, therefore, from an ex ante perspective 
exhibited substantially different degrees of vulnerability to what happened next, a sudden 
shortage in dollar funding. In terms of the identification strategy above, this translates in 
different ΔD  . Through model specification (2), where destination country fixed effect indicators 
are included, we test if the lending to a certain emerging market economy by banking systems 
that were ex ante highly vulnerable to dollar funding shocks changed more from the crisis than 
the lending to the same emerging market by banking systems that were ex ante less dollar 
vulnerable.  We perform these tests separately for cross-border lending and for local lending by 
foreign-owned banks.  We also explore whether government interventions to affect the bank 
lending channel and maintain loan supply were effective. In particular, we focus on the so-called 
Vienna Initiative, discussed further below. 
While our empirical exercise lends itself very nicely to the same identification strategy, 
we are obviously limited by the scope of our sample size: Khawja and Mian (2008) had 
extensive micro-level data where each observation was a bank-firm loan, with a total sample size 
                                                 
8 Khawja and Mian (2008) actually argue for a possible negative correlation and in their case found evidence 
consistent with their prior.  10 
 
above 20,000 observations.
9 In our case, as discussed in section III.2, we use data for 17 source 
countries lending to 94 emerging economies, with a total theoretical sample size of 1598 
observations, but that is smaller in practice since not all source countries may be lending to all 
destinations.  
Another part of our empirics considers whether domestically-owned banks in emerging 
markets had balance sheet vulnerabilities to supply shocks via their reliance on cross-border 
sources of funding, leading to a loan supply response.  The testing of the existence of this third 
channel of transmission, however, can only be based on simple cross sectional regressions using 
lending data by domestic banks in the emerging markets. The inability to “correct” for 
contemporaneous changes in loan demand is a problem. However, we can assess the potential 
severity of the demand bias from the estimation results obtained analyzing the local lending of 
foreign banks, under the assumption that local foreign banks and local domestic banks face 
similar loan demand schedules.  In the empirical exercise we analyze post-pre crisis domestic 
lending growth in relation to two variables related to cross-border funding. One variable is total 
cross-border bank lending to the emerging market (summed across all source markets) relative to 
total domestic bank lending in the same emerging market.  The second variable embeds a more 
nuanced view of which source countries accounted for this cross-border bank lending. 
Specifically, we consider the extent of funding sourced from low ex ante dollar-vulnerable 
countries or from high ex ante dollar-vulnerable countries.  This exercise allows us to address the 
issue of whether loan supply contracted the most in the crisis for the domestically-owned banks 
that relied the most on any cross-border financing (emerging market banking system most open 
to international funding markets), or whether instead the contraction was mainly the result of 





                                                 
9 The constraint imposed by the fixed effect specification is that, by relying on a within firm comparison of lending 
by two separate banks, it can only be implemented on the subset of firms borrowing ex ante from more than one 
bank. This limitations lead to a drastic reduction in sample size in the Khawja and Mian (2008) exercise (but still 
leaving them with more than 5,000 unique bank/firm observations).  In our case, this is less of an issue, since at an 
aggregate level only a handful of destination countries in the dataset borrow from just one source country. In our 
regression analysis those destination countries are excluded.  11 
 
III.2 Data  
Bank lending data. The bilateral data on international bank lending are from the Bank for 
International Settlements’ (BIS) Consolidated International Banking Statistics. This database 
contains information on positions of banks from BIS reporting countries with respect to 
counterparties around the world, with data aggregated across all reporting banks from the source 
countries.  The two main lending variables are: 1) international claims, which capture the sum of 
cross border lending and local claims extended in foreign currency, and 2) local claims in local 
currency. These variables are our proxies for cross-border lending and local lending, 
respectively, by foreign-owned banks in destination markets.
10  Our analysis includes data for 17 
source countries and 94 destination countries from three emerging market regions: Latin 
America (30 countries), Emerging Asia (21 countries), and Emerging Europe (43 countries).  
The source countries are: the United States, Japan, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, and Italy. The list of destination countries is provided in Appendix Table 1.
11 
  The pattern of partnering between developed countries and the emerging markets 
validates our application of the Khwaja and Mian (2008) approach. Table 1 presents the 
destination countries as rows, focusing only on the 8 largest emerging markets in each region, 
and shows how many of the seventeen source countries were partners in cross-border lending or 
local lending for each destination in the pre-crisis and crisis period. The cross-border flows come 
from a wider array of source countries compared with local claims, where financial sector 
foreign direct investment is a precondition. The similarity of pre- and post- columns for both 
international claims and local claims shows that the capital flow adjustments were on the 
intensive margin (quantity adjustments vis-a-vis existing partners) and not the extensive margin 
(countries added or dropped as partners), at least as measured at the level of bank-country 
observations. Table 1A presents information on the number of destination countries, out of the 
                                                 
10 The treatment of local claims in foreign currency in the database makes these proxy variables instead of true 
representations. 
11 Some gaps appear in the data available in DBSonline, and are due to confidentiality concerns of the reporting 
central banks. For example, Both Denmark and Finland no longer have a numerous national banking system, as 
most of their domestic banks have over time been bought up by larger banks from other Scandinavian countries. 
When reported data is the aggregate from a small number of commercial banks, the reporting central banks may 
report the observations to the BIS marked with Observation Level Confidentiality C Confidential, and this data is 
suppressed from export to DBSonline. The bank type B Domestic Banks amounts vis-à-vis developing countries are 
not in DBSonline, but the bank type A All Banks amounts are available there. 12 
 
full sample of 94, that are served by very few of the (17) source countries. All destination EMs 
receive cross-border funds. Only two EMs are served by a single source, and need to be dropped 
from the fixed effects estimation sample. Almost all destination EMs receive cross-country funds 
from more than three sources. The patterns, as expected, are much different for local claims. 
Twenty-six EMs do not have local claims extended by any of the 17 source countries, while 
another 19 EMs have only 1 source presented. The EM country sample for the fixed effects 
specifications is the remaining group of 49 countries. 
Table 2 provides a complementary set of observations from the vantage point of the 
respective source countries.  In cross border flows (international claims), a majority of the 
emerging markets were served by France and Great Britain, followed by another broader group 
of active European lenders and the United States. In local claims, source countries have more 
limited international footprints as measured in terms of numbers of EM destinations. Some 
source countries have had very little entry into EM banking systems (Australia, Ireland, 
Luxembourg) while banks from other source countries have a broader global presence (United 
States, France, Great Britain, Netherlands). 
The upper panel of Table 3 provides detailed summary information covering bilateral and 
domestic lending growth pre-crisis versus in the post-crisis period. These summary data directly 
pertain to the dependent variables to be used in the formal econometric exercises. Cross-border 
lending will include 1032 observations, while the number of local claims observations is smaller, 
at 267. Positive mean pre-post values pick up a general upward trend in lending patterns. 
Nonetheless, there is a wide range of experiences across pairs of countries, as illustrated by the 
minimum, maximum, and standard deviation columns.  
The final piece of lending information pertains to lending by domestically-owned banks. 
Since such information is not readily available for the broad group of 94 EMs we construct a 
proxy by combining the BIS local claims data and information from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).  From the IFS data we extract series on Bank 
Claims on Private Sector and Bank Claims on the Central Government.
12  Then, we construct 
domestic bank lending as the sum of Bank Claims on Private Sector plus Claims on Central 
                                                 
12 IFS 22d for bank lending means something slightly different for different countries (most often claims on private 
sector from banking institutions, but sometimes claims on other sectors from deposit money banks or another 
combination). 22a through c are claims on central government, state and local governments, and nonfinancial public 
enterprises. 13 
 
Government from (both IFS), net of the total of Local Claims in Local Currency from all BIS 
reporting countries. The last row of Table 3 shows that our analysis will work with a smaller 
sample of data, on 62 country observations on the change in domestic bank lending growth, with 
there being a wide range of positive and negative values across countries. 
 
Banking Sector Dollar Vulnerability. A third type of data used in the econometrics is a 
constructed indicator of banking system vulnerability at the onset of the crisis. Recall that the 
strategy for identifying lending supply shocks relies on the observation that, from an ex ante 
perspective, banks from different developed countries had differing degrees of vulnerability to 
U.S. dollar funding shocks. This vulnerability was the result of the buildup of dollar-
denominated assets on their balance sheets and degrees of maturity mismatching between dollar 
assets and corresponding funding sources. As shown by McGuire and von Peter (2009a, b), there 
were substantial differences across countries in the tendency of internationally active banks to 
accumulate mismatches.  
Using confidential components of the BIS International and Consolidated Banking 
Statistics, McGuire and von Peter have constructed three alternative measures capturing the 
degree of dollar vulnerability for a number of developed-economy banking systems (see box).  
The basic idea is that the measures reflect gross short term U.S. dollar funding risks. All 
measures include the summed external liabilities of banking systems, with differences in whether 
some exposures are treated as gross or as net of corresponding asset positions. For example, 
measures V1 and V2 differ only with respect to treatment of liabilities to banks, taken either as 
net or gross positions. V3 also contains net positions of country banks vis-à-vis non-banks, but 
only if these positions are liabilities of the banks. 
We use the values of these three alternative measures of country-specific dollar 
vulnerability calculated at the time right before the onset of the crisis. Basic summary statistics 
are provided in Table 3, Panel B, together with the computation of the pair wise correlations 
across the three ex-ante measures of banking system dollar vulnerability. The summary statistics 
show a substantial degree of cross-sectional variability for each measure. The pairwise 
correlations of measures are high, especially across V1 and V2. By construction, V3 is most 
different from the other two (reflected also in the lower correlations) and also based on the 





Panel B also provides information of the magnitude of banking system imbalances in 
2007, at the outset of the crisis, for a subset of the group of seventeen source countries.
13  Using 
V2 as the reference measure, the data show that German banks had $865 billion of dollar funding 
needs, while Spanish and U.K. banks had needs of $247 billion and $1.5 trillion, respectively.  
When these constructions are normalized by the total international claims of banks from these 
same countries, Germany had relatively low ex ante dollar vulnerability, at 25.4 percent of 
external loans, while the U.K. banks had relatively high funding needs, at 90 percents of 
international loans. Based on the distribution of observations across source banking countries, 
Germany had low (percentage) banking sector dollar vulnerability, while Spain was moderate, 
and U.K. banking system vulnerability was high. 
 
Policy Initiative. Finally, our econometric exercise allows for the possibility of global bank 
transmission consequences of the so-called Vienna Initiative that was contracted between banks 
and internally active banks in Europe in February 2009 with the goal of preventing a 
destabilization of Emerging Europe. This joint international financial institution action plan 
                                                 
13 Due to the confidential nature of the data, we are only authorized to display actual vulnerability figures for a 
limited subset of the source countries. 
Definitions of the three gross short term dollar funding need measures.  
 
All three measures are normalized by each country’s total international claims for the 
econometric work.  
V1: Liabilities to official monetary authorities + International liabilities to non-banks + 
Local liabilities to US residents booked by US offices + Liabilities to banks + cross-
currency FX swap (if negative);  
V2: Liabilities to official monetary authorities + International liabilities to non-banks + 
Local liabilities to US residents booked by US offices + Net Liabilities to banks  + 
cross-currency FX swap (if negative);  
V3 either : Liabilities to official monetary authorities + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-
currency FX swap (if negative) + Net positions vis-à-vis non-banks (if negative), or 
Liabilities to official monetary authorities + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency 
FX swap (if negative) (if Net positions vis-à-vis non-banks is positive). 
 15 
 
resulted in a total of $10.8 billion of support committed to a range of European banks to support 
their lending to ten European Union countries, the Western Balkans, and Turkey.  Beyond the 
private banks participating in this program, the public policy partners included the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank Group, and the 
World Bank.  Appendix Table 2 provides details on reported disbursements through this program 
through September 2009, by bank and by destination country. 
 
III.3 Bank transmission from industrialized to emerging markets 
A non-parametric illustration.  The identification strategy can be appreciated first with a simple, 
non-parametric exercise comparing average international lending to emerging markets before 
and after the crisis event, between banking systems that were ex ante highly vulnerable to dollar 
funding shocks and those that were instead less vulnerable. We defined the pre-crisis period from 
2006q2 to 2007q2 and the post-crisis period from 2008q3 to 2009q2. As previously noted, we 
purposefully leave out the intermediate period between 2007q3 and 2008q2. Arguably the 
Lehman’s events in September 2008 mark the cleanest and most important crisis event, but at the 
same time the last quarter of “normal” market functioning goes back to the time prior to August 
2007. Alternative datings of the period before the dollar funding shock and following this shock 
certainly can be argued and were considered in robustness tests.
14  
For this first exercise, we divide source banking countries into two groups – those with 
high or low ex ante dollar vulnerability. We compute the (log of) lending growth by source 
country vis-à-vis each destination country and then take averages across pre- or post- periods, 
averages across destinations, and averages across groups of source countries. We defined high 
(low) dollar vulnerable countries as those with values of the vulnerability measure V2 above 
(below) the median. In the subsequent regression analysis, we make use of the whole information 
embedded in the continuous variables V’s, and not just use of the coarse high-low vulnerability 
groupings. 
Time averages across each of the intervals and broad vulnerability divisions are provided 
in Table 4. For cross-border lending, shown in the top panel, countries with high ex ante dollar 
vulnerability exhibited higher average lending growth than low vulnerability countries before the 
                                                 
14 In order to address the robustness of the empirics under alternative timing assumptions, we have experimented 
with a number of alternative definitions for both the pre and post periods. The choice of alternative dates does not 
really have any material impact on the results. Results based on alternative time windows are available upon request. 16 
 
crisis (first row comparison). While these level differences can be attributed to basic country-
specific factors, such differences are not what drive the identification. In the period after the 
dollar crisis hit, the data indicates higher average numbers for both sub group of countries and 
the same rank order (second row comparison).
15 However, even the difference in post crisis 
lending levels is not driving the identification. What matters is the comparison of the lending 
growth pre to post period between the high and the low vulnerability countries. This comparison, 
obtained taking the difference-in-difference value from Table 4 (figure in bold) shows that ex 
ante high vulnerability countries displayed ex post about 15 percent lower cross-border lending 
growth to emerging markets than low vulnerability countries. Another way to interpret this 
result, based on comparing the level difference pre crisis with the level difference post crisis 
(figures in the row marginals), is that due to the crisis and the consequent balance sheet liquidity 
shocks hitting banks, the countries that ex ante were less exposed to the dollar funding shock 
were more able to partially close the cross-border lending gap to emerging markets compared to 
the more exposed source countries. 
The same exercise performed for the local lending in local currencies by the foreign 
banks is shown in the right-most cells of the same rows of Table 4. As with cross border lending, 
local lending exhibits similar pre- and post- crisis patterns for both high and low vulnerability 
funding source countries. The only difference is in the scale. As the difference-in-difference 
comparison shows, low vulnerability countries exhibited a 49 percent higher local lending 
growth rate in the crisis aftermath, compared with the high vulnerability countries.  
These results for cross-border lending growth and local lending growth are suggestive of 
a potentially important lending supply shock from developed country banks to emerging market 
economies, with the shock magnified for banks that ex ante exhibited greater balance sheet 
vulnerabilities. While suggestive, this non-parametric exercise, however, is limited as it cannot 
take into account differences in the lending destinations. It could be that high vulnerability 
countries were disproportionately focusing their lending in a particular group of emerging 
markets that perhaps experienced stronger credit demand shocks.  
                                                 
15 Higher numbers post crisis are likely driven by a steep increase in the pre-crisis quarters, so that time averaging 
yields relatively lower numbers pre than post. We could have chosen the observation right at the quarter before the 
crisis and the last quarter in the data set to do the comparison, but the time averages have the advantage of 
smoothing out quarter-specific idiosyncratic factors. In any case, as argued in the main text, the identification does 
not rely on the simple pre-post comparison on levels but on the comparison in the pre-post growth between the two 
sub-group of countries.  17 
 
As another exploratory exercise prior to starting the formal empirical analysis, we 
performed a basic check on the reliance of the vulnerability measures. We ran basic regressions 
using the post-pre growth measures for both cross-border and local lending as dependent 
variables and the whole set of fixed effects for source and destination countries on the right hand 
side. If the presumption is correct, that source countries with ex-ante higher dollar imbalances 
should be the ones to suffer the largest balance sheet shock and therefore those that reduce 
lending the most, it should be the case that the vulnerability measures should be correlated with 
the series of estimated coefficients of the source country indicator variables. In other words, 
those countries exhibiting larger changes in lending growth around the crisis should also be the 
ones with the higher values of the vulnerability measures. This pattern is verified in the data.
16 
 
Formal econometric study of transmission. To separate loan demand from loan supply effects we 
next turn to the more formal approach involving the estimation of equations (1) with OLS and 
equation (2), where destination country differences are taken into account by the destination 
fixed effect (FE) indicator variables.  Both OLS and FE specifications are informative. While the 
OLS estimates are by construction biased, their comparison with the FE estimates provides 
insights on the degree of bias associated with the simultaneous shocks to lending demand 
experienced by destination markets. Specifications are performed over cross-border lending 
growth, with baselines presented in Table 5, and local claims growth, presented in Table 6. 
Columns 1-3 of each table focus on the basic OLS specifications, columns 4-6 prove the results 
of fixed effects specifications, and columns 7-8 includes consideration of the Vienna Initiative 
implemented within Europe. Since we have three alternative measures of ex ante vulnerability, 
we run similar regressions using the three measures separately. Moreover, in order to fully 
exploit the information contained in the vulnerability measures, in the regression analysis we use 
                                                 
16 The results from these regression checks are reassuring. The V measures exhibit high correlations with the fixed 
effect estimated coefficients from both cross-border and local lending regressions. The correlations vis-à-vis the 
coefficients from the cross-border lending regression are higher, around 0.6, and highly significant. The correlations 
vis-à-vis the coefficients from the local lending regression are smaller, ranging between 0.35 and 0.55 across the 
three V measures, and significant for one of the three measures. This pattern of relative strength in the results will be 
found in the formal regression analysis as well, in large part probably due to the fact that, as already mentioned 
above, the sample size for cross-border lending is much greater than that for local lending. We thank Romain 
Ranciere for suggesting running this test. 
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the actual indexes rather than the simpler dummy grouping countries that indicated ex ante 
vulnerability above or below the median of the source countries.  
First, consider the pre-post shock consequences for cross-border lending growth (Table 
5). The coefficients on the vulnerability proxies in the first three columns show the relationship 
between ex ante source country vulnerability and the extent of slowed lending growth ex post. 
Countries that ex ante had more severe potential exposure to a dollar funding crisis had 
significantly lower ex post rates of cross-border lending growth to emerging markets. The results 
are consistent across the three different vulnerability measures. A low vulnerability banking 
source would have continued lending growth post shock, while high vulnerability was associated 
with reversals. 
In columns 4 to 6 we report the results from the corresponding fixed effect estimations.
17 
The estimates of    still are largely negative and significant. As expected, the comparison of 4-6 
with the OLS estimates of 1-3 indicates some role played by concomitant changes in demand. 
The fixed effect estimates are systematically lower (in absolute value) than the corresponding 
OLS ones. At least part of the reduction in cross-border lending activity is attributable to a 
simultaneous decline in demand for cross-border loans. The magnitude of this loan demand 
shock, however, seems to be relatively small.  
  Next, consider the impact of the crisis on growth of local claims, with results reported in 
Table 6. As before, the OLS estimates using the three distinct measures of vulnerability are 
reported in the first three columns. The estimated effects of the shock event are again quite 
strong and in the expected direction with loan supply contractions particularly strong when 
affiliate banks overseas were ex ante more vulnerable. The model with fixed effects, columns 4-
6, indicates relatively smaller estimated coefficients (in absolute value). By and large, however, 
the results confirm that the lower growth in local claims on emerging markets is largely due to 
the supply shock from ex ante vulnerable banking systems.  
Next, consider the magnitude of effects for local claims growth when controls are 
introduced for the Vienna Initiative (columns 7 and 8). These specifications lead to reduced 
                                                 
17 Note that the FE specification is based on the comparison of lending growth by at least two different source 
countries with different degrees of dollar vulnerability to the same destination country. Hence, in what follows we 
need to restrict the regression analysis by excluding those destination countries that do not maintain flows from at 
least two source countries. Of course this set if different in the analysis for cross border lending from that for local 
lending, but the differences in sample size with the corresponding OLS regressions is explained by the imposition of 
this constraint. 19 
 
significance of ex ante vulnerability in general. Instead, the Vienna countries appear to be 
associated with mitigated local lending declines.  Such reduced effects of the crisis on local 
claims growth, in particular in emerging Europe, were a key goal of the Vienna Initiative. 
Also notice that the magnitude of reported coefficients in Table 6 is significantly smaller 
(in absolute terms) than in Table 5. The implication is that the role of differences in banking 
system vulnerability plays out strongest in the arena of cross border flows. We calculated the 
economic significance of the identified supply shocks. Table 7 presents examples of such 
impacts, focusing on three source countries for funding that are in the low, median, and high end 
of the ex ante vulnerability spectrum across the countries of our sample.  Using the specifications 
of column (5) of Tables 5 and 6, we observe cross border lending supply growth after the crisis 
that was 8.02 percent lower than in the pre-crisis period for Germany, and comparable changes 
of 28.44 percent lower for the United Kingdom.  Local claims supply adjustments also were 




There are various potential critiques of the methodology we have applied to isolate loan demand 
from international loan supply effects of the shock. Such critiques include questioning the 
assumption of exogeneity of the shock event, our treatment of ex ante dollar vulnerability as a 
defining feature of source country banking systems while instead potentially proxying for other 
source country bank characteristics, time trends in lending across destinations, and the inclusion 
of United States as a source country. Below, we consider the robustness of our results to each of 
these critiques. 
 
Shock endogeneity. The significance of the econometric results is heavily based on the 
presumption that the shock event, materializing in a severe shortage of U.S. dollar funding, is 
exogenous to the lending dynamics to emerging market countries. We think there is a legitimate 
case for the assumed exogeneity of the shock event. First, this particular crisis did not originate 
in emerging markets. Second, the accumulation of dollar exposure by developed countries’ banks 
was very much driven by investment strategies of the developed economy’s banks and did not 
derive in any quantitatively significant way from economic dynamics in emerging markets 20 
 
countries, nor from specific lending policies toward these economies. As McGuire and von Peter 
(2009b) clearly state: “…banks’ (particularly European banks’) foreign positions have surged 
since 2000 … As banks’ balance sheets grew, so did their appetite for foreign currency assets, 
notably US dollar-denominated claims on non-bank entities. These assets include retail and 
corporate lending, loans to hedge funds, and holdings of structured finance products based on US 
mortgages and other underlying assets. During the build-up, the low perceived risk (high ratings) 
of these instruments appeared to offer attractive return opportunities; during the crisis they 
became the main source of mark to market losses. …” (p. 1). Consequently, the dollar 
vulnerability of different developed countries banking systems in the months prior to the crisis 
can be reasonably assumed to be independently determined by the concomitant level of lending 
activity to emerging market countries. 
 
Dollar vulnerability as a proxy for other bank balance sheet characteristics. A related concern is 
that, in fact, different levels of dollar vulnerability are just the reflection of specific ex-ante 
differences across source country banks in other balance sheet characteristics and do not reflect 
the relative severity of balance sheet shocks. We can test this alternative hypothesis by 
conducting a series of “horse races”, by sequentially controlling for pre-crisis bank balance sheet 
characteristics by country in the main fixed effect specification of equation (2). The set of 
country-level bank balance sheet variables identified for this purpose are: the ratio of private 
credit by deposit money banks to GDP as a measure of the importance of banking activity in 
source markets (pcrdbgdp); the ratio of bank's overhead costs to total assets as a measure of 
banking efficiency (overhead); the return on equity (roe) and return on assets (roa) as measures 
of performance; the equity to asset ratio as a measure of banking capitalization (cap); the z-score 
as a measure of risk (zscore);
 18 a measure of the share of deposits that are offshore (offdep); and 
the log of total international claims as a broad measure of global size (linclaims). Table 8, Panel 
A, reports the pairwise correlations among these variables and the measure V2 of dollar 
vulnerability.  While there are strong correlations across some of these financial variables, for 
example between cap with roa or overhead, the correlations are weaker for the V2 variable 
(adjusted by international claims). 
                                                 
18 The data is from the World Bank update to Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000). 21 
 
In Table 8, Panel B, we report the estimation results from a range of alternative 
specifications, which are the baseline specifications (columns 5 of Tables 5 and 6) where the V2 
measure “competes” against each of these additional variables that are introduced within the 
regression.  We report only the resulting coefficients and the significance of the variable V2 from 
these alternative FE regression specifications, with each cell of Panel B drawn from a distinct 
regression specification. The coefficients estimated for V2 remain fairly stable, both for cross 
border lending growth and for local claims growth.  This finding indicates that the degree of 
dollar vulnerability is capturing a specific type of funding fragility exhibited by developed 
countries’ banks prior to the crisis and had a direct impact on lending dynamics in emerging 
market countries.  
 
Time trends. Another potential critique of our findings is that the accumulation of dollar 
liabilities and the subsequent crisis had no effect on changes in lending to EM economies, and 
that the difference detected between high- and low-vulnerability source countries is just the 
result of pre-existing differences in time trends. Analyses of the time series dynamics in both 
cross-border and local lending for high- and low-vulnerability countries do not support this 
claim. In Table 9 we report quarterly averages in (log) lending for the two separate groups of 
countries. For ease of comparison, both series are depicted as differences between value in each 
quarter and value at time zero (set at 2007q2), so that the vertical axis indicates the growth rate 
between each respective quarter and time zero. Panel A reports cross-border lending. While there 
was a detectable difference in time trends in the pre-crisis quarters, or at least through 2006, the 
chart shows that there was a visibly significant change in trend for both series in the quarters 
after 2007q2, and certainly an important difference in growth rate trends from 2008q3 and 
onward. A similar pattern can be detected for local lending in Panel B. Pre-crisis time series had 
a similar trend, but trends changed, even more dramatically in the post-crisis period.    
 
Results driven by the inclusion of U.S. banks. We recognize that the dollar vulnerability measure 
may have a distinct interpretation for U.S. banks which can readily access dollar-based liquidity 
facilities such as the discount window and special facilities that emerged during the crisis.
19 In 
                                                 
19 Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010) provide details on the availability of dollars to financial institutions outside 
the United States via central bank dollar swap facilities that were established. 22 
 
addition, the conversion of investment banks into commercial banks, with data for the latter 
included in the post sample of BIS data, may influence the outcomes of the regression analysis.
20 
We perform regression specifications excluding observations on U.S. lending to the respective 
emerging markets and generate qualitatively similar results. 
 
III.5 Domestic lending 
The final channel of international transmission through banks was posited to work 
through the funding of local, domestic banks.  In this section we test whether such banks in 
emerging markets experienced a loan supply shock of their own as a result of the changes in 
cross-border lending of foreign banks. One component of cross-border lending is lending to local 
banks, in which case the original supply shock transmitted into cross-border financing could also 
determine a second round lending supply effect through the impact on the balance sheet of the 
local banks.
21 For this part of the empirical exercise, data at the level of aggregate lending by 
domestic banks leaves just the cross-sectional variability of destination countries for analysis. 
Moreover, while our full sample of emerging markets covers 94 countries, a significant share of 
these countries do not have adequate domestic lending data in the IFS or have totals for domestic 
lending that show some inconsistencies with the BIS local claims data.  58 countries are used in 
the final regression analysis. For this reason, we can produce qualitative results that can, at best, 
provide indications of the existence of this effect.  
If local domestic banks experience a lending supply shock as a result of changes in cross-
border funding by foreign banks, then one could expect that – all else equal – this shock would 
be larger exactly in those emerging markets where cross-border bank borrowing came 
predominantly from those banking systems that were ex ante more vulnerable to the original 
credit market disruptions. The BIS international banking statistics provide a breakdown of total 
cross border claims in cross border lending to banks and cross border lending to non banks 
(private and public sectors). Hence, from the cross border lending to banks data by source and 
destination country we compute total cross-border lending to banks for each destination country 
from all BIS reporting countries during the pre-crisis period. We then compute the fraction of 
this total that came from ex ante vulnerable countries, using the same high versus low ex ante 
                                                 
20 We thank Patrick McGuire for pointing this out. 
21 At least for Latin American countries we know of significant tightening in domestic funding sources as  a result of 
the crisis (Jara, Moreno and Tovar, 2009) 23 
 
vulnerability classification used in the non-parametric exercise of Table 4. Subsequently, we 
compute for each destination country the fraction of total cross-border bank borrowing from high 
vulnerable countries. We also compute the ratio of cross-border bank-to-bank lending into a 
destination, relative to the total amount of lending done by domestic banks (share x-border). 
This second variable captures the degree of overall “openness” to international funding markets 
by banks in EM countries. The dependent variable in our regressions is the pre-post comparison 
of lending growth for domestic banks in each emerging market.  
If lending of domestic banks in emerging markets was exposed to the financial crisis 
through cross-border linkages, is it the case that countries with banks having the highest reliance 
on cross-border borrowing overall were the one to suffer the largest declines in domestic 
lending? Or is the exposure only through reliance on banking systems with high ex ante 
vulnerability? Table 10, column (1), shows that lending contractions by domestic banks in 
emerging markets were stronger if they had been especially dependent on cross border 
borrowing from ex ante more vulnerable banking systems.  Column (2) shows that differences 
across countries in the overall openness to cross-border borrowing were instead not significant in 
explaining ex post lending growth contractions. If anything, overall openness generated an 
opposite, positive effect. Columns (3) and (4) combine these terms in regression specifications, 
but continue to support the same suggestive relationships between ex ante exposures to 
international capital and ex post adjustments. Hence, openness of emerging market banking 
systems to international funding does not seem to have been a source of propagation of the 
original shock. Exposure to international funding from source countries that were ex ante more 
likely to suffer from the shock instead provided for multiple and independent channels of shock 
transmission.  
The economic effect of such changes cannot be accurately gauged from these 
econometric specifications as we cannot correct for concomitant changes in demand. However, 
the results from the regressions on local claims of foreign banks offer information on this issue: 
assuming that both local domestic banks and local foreign banks face a similar demand schedule, 
we know that the FE regressions on local lending by foreign banks indicated the existence of a 
simultaneous demand change, which amounted to a reduction of about 25 percent in the size of 
the estimated coefficient of the vulnerability measure (comparing column (2) and (5) of Table 6). 24 
 
Applying a similar correction to the estimated coefficient in column (1) of Table 10 suggest that 
the effective supply shock on domestic lending was still substantial. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
The opening of capital markets to allow foreign bank participation, either through 
expanded cross-border lending activity or via direct entry into local banking markets, produces 
significant benefits to emerging markets in terms of enhanced efficiency, liquidity provision, 
risk-sharing, and overall superior growth opportunities. Global banks also have been 
demonstrably more resilient and better prepared to handle shocks originating in emerging 
markets.  However, the transmission of a large shock from source countries to emerging markets 
has raised concerns about the mechanisms for such transmission and appropriate policy 
responses. Our analysis has demonstrated that both foreign-owned banks and local stand-alone 
banks are expected to be impacted by foreign liquidity conditions but to differing degrees. These 
magnitudes are based on their exposure to cross-border funding and to the internal capital 
markets of the broader banking organizations in which they participate.  
Direct transmission of the shock is through the cross-border lending of source countries. 
Indirect transmission occurs through the internal capital markets of globalized banks,
22 where 
reduced support of emerging market affiliates or increased outflows from emerging markets 
trigger reduced lending at home by these affiliates.  Domestically-owned banks in emerging 
markets are not immune to transmission and associated lending growth contraction. Reliance on 
cross-border funding does not necessarily lead to international transmission of shocks.  The ex 
ante balance sheets of source countries appear to matter for the ex post consequences. 
While cross-border lending and internal capital markets are both conduits for 
international shock transmission, both positive and negative, these features are not an argument 
for concluding that closed or reduced access to international capital markets is welfare-
improving for emerging markets.  Instead, the results suggest the importance of addressing the 
vulnerabilities in source funding markets so that these funding sources remain a net positive for 
the economies in which they operate.  The results also highlight a potentially new reality across 
markets on the relative importance of respective channels of international transmission. As stated 
                                                 
22 Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) show that such internal capital markets are activated in U.S. banks in response to 
monetary policy conditions. 25 
 
by Donald Kohn, the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, “… when liquidity conditions tighten 
in one country, globally active banks may attempt to pull liquidity from overseas affiliates, 
reducing the liquidity consequences at home but simultaneously transmitting the shock abroad. 
What is particularly interesting is that in some cases, financial linkages might now be more 
important for transmission than the traditional trade linkages.”
 23 
                                                 
23 Kohn (2008). 26 
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Table 1A   Number of BIS Countries (of 17) Engaged in Lending to 24 Emerging Markets 
    International Claims   Local Claims in Local Currency 
 


























Argentina  17 17 9 10 
Brazil  17 17 10 12 
Chile  17 16 8 9 
Colombia  16 16 6 6 
Costa Rica  15 16 4 4 
Mexico  17 17 7 8 
Peru  15 16 7 5 















China  17 17 10 12 
India  17 17 8 9 
Indonesia  17 17 8 8 
Malaysia  16 16 9 9 
Philippines  17 16 6 7 
Korea  17 17 10 8 
Taiwan  17 17 10 11 

















Turkey  17 17 10 8 
Slovakia  16 16 9 8 
Russia  17 17 8 9 
Romania  16 17 6 6 
Poland  16 17 13 13 
Hungary  17 16 11 10 
Czech Republic  17 17 10 10 
Croatia  16 16 2 3 
 
Table 1B Number of Emerging Market Destinations with Counts of Source Countries 
 
Lending Type     Time Frame  # of Destinations with Source Countries  
  # of Source Countries: 0  1  2  3+ 
International 
Claims  
Pre Crisis (2006Q3- 2007 Q2)  0  2  3  89 




Pre Crisis (2006Q3- 2007 Q2)  26  19  12  37 
Post Crisis (2008Q3-2009Q2)  24  19  15  36 
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Table 2  Number of Emerging Market Countries (of 94) in BIS Reporting Country Lending  
 
  International Claims (Cross-Border)  Local Claims in Local Currency 








United States  72 76 41 42 
Japan  50 47 15 15 
Australia  33 32  1 3 
Belgium  72 71 11 14 
Canada  63 65 21 22 
Switzerland  80 79 23 23 
Germany  82 81 19 23 
Denmark  59 58 13 1 
Spain  70 67 16 17 
France  86 82 34 43 
Great Britain  86 86 37 35 
Ireland  46 43  2 1 
Sweden  64 63  6 7 
Portugal  52 49  5 5 
Netherlands  79 78 29 29 
Luxembourg  37 38  0 0 




Table 3A Summary statistics on Lending Growth 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
        
Pre-post cross-border lending growth  1032 0.263 0.968 -6.031  4.727
  To EM Europe  303 0.459 0.919 -5.524  4.054
  To EM Latin America  346 0.207 0.892 -3.105  4.727
  To EM Asia  383 0.159 1.049 -6.031  4.094
Pre-post local lending growth  267 0.394 0.889 -6.788  5.215
  To EM Europe  88 0.688 0.921 -0.766  5.215
  To EM Latin America  85 0.243 0.760 -2.100  3.379
  To EM Asia  94 0.254 0.907 -6.788  2.197
        
Pre-post domestic  lending growth  62 0.409     0.306 -0.755  1.023
        
Table 3B Summary statistics on ex ante dollar vulnerability 
  correlations  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
V1   17 0.780 0.506 0.064  1.674
V2  0.992 17 0.611 0.447 0.051  1.455
V3  0.702    0.710  17 0.208 0.207 0.009  0.831
 
                Examples of ex ante dollar vulnerability values and scale 
 Germany  Spain  United  Kingdom 
  $billion  share  $billion  share    $billion     share 
V1  1,165 0.342  294 0.693  1,797 1.060 
V2  865 0.254  247 0.578  1,524 0.900 
V3  311 0.091  72 0.169  265 0.156 
 
Lending in the “pre” crisis period is defined as the time average between 2006q2 and 2007q2. Lending in the “post” crisis 
period is defined as the time average between 2008q3 and 2009q2. Cross-border lending is lending of foreign banks to an EM 
destination country originated in the source country. Local lending is the lending of local offices of foreign banks in local 
currency in each EM country. Domestic lending is the aggregate lending by domestic banks in each EM country. Pre-post 
lending growth is calculated as the log change between the post- and the pre-crisis periods. Twenty-six of the 94 countries 
had missing or incomplete domestic claims data (IFS), and six other emerging markets had domestic claims data (IFS) 
exceeded by total local claims data. 
The measures of ex-ante dollar vulnerability are calculated using country-specific gross and net US Dollar aggregates. The 
definitions of the three measures are as follows. V1: Liabilities to official monetary authorities + International liabilities to 
non-banks + Local liabilities to US residents booked by US offices + Liabilities to banks + cross-currency FX swap (if 
negative); V2: Liabilities to official monetary authorities + International liabilities to non-banks + Local liabilities to US 
residents booked by US offices + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency FX swap (if negative); V3 either : Liabilities to 
official monetary authorities + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency FX swap (if negative) + Net positions vis-à-vis non-
banks (if negative), or Liabilities to official monetary authorities + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency FX swap (if 
negative) (if Net positions vis-à-vis non-banks is positive).  Shares are presented in the correlations and summary statistics 
cells.  These shares are the raw values of the vulnerability measures divided by country international claims. 32 
 
Table 4   Non-Parametric Comparisons of Lending Growth 
 
  Cross-Border Lending  Local Lending 












Pre-Crisis  4.16 4.41  -0.25 5.39 6.34  -0.95
Post-Crisis  4.53 4.63  -0.10 6.13 6.59  -0.46
Post-Pre  0.37  0.22 0.15 0.74 0.25  0.49
 
Low vulnerability countries are those source countries with a measure of vulnerability V2 below the median. High vulnerability 
countries have a measure V2 above the median. The “pre” crisis period is defined as the time average between 2006q2 and 
2007q2. The “post” crisis period is defined as the time average between 2008q3 and 2009q2. The figures reported in the table are 




Table 5  Cross-border lending growth to emerging markets 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  OLS  OLS  OLS FE  FE  FE OLS FE 
             
 
 
i D   
proxy 
V1  -0.307***     -0.271***        
   (0.063)     (0.0606)        
V2    -0.354***     -0.316***   -0.417*** -0.380***
    (0.0711)     (0.0689)    (0.081)  (0.078) 
V3      -0.778*** 
(0.176) 
   -0.605*** 
(0.172) 
   
Vienna           -0.113  -0.037 
           (0.227)  (0.218) 
V2·Vienna           -0.049  -0.309 
           (0.650)  (0.625) 
 
Constant 
   
0.508*** 
    
0.486*** 
   
0.410*** 
    
0.561*** 
 
  (0.058)  (0.054)  (0.045)      (0.070)   
             
Observations  1,032  1,032  1,032 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,032  1,029 
R-squared  0.023  0.024  0.019 0.249 0.250 0.243 0.026  0.253 
 
The measures of ex-ante dollar vulnerability are calculated using country-specific gross and net US Dollar aggregates. The definitions of 
the three measures are as follows. V1: Liabilities to official monetary authorities + International liabilities to non-banks + Local liabilities 
to US residents booked by US offices + Liabilities to banks + cross-currency FX swap (if negative); V2: Liabilities to official monetary 
authorities + International liabilities to non-banks + Local liabilities to US residents booked by US offices + Net Liabilities to banks  + 
cross-currency FX swap (if negative); V3 either : Liabilities to official monetary authorities + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency FX 
swap (if negative) + Net positions vis-à-vis non-banks (if negative), or Liabilities to official monetary authorities + Net Liabilities to banks  
+ cross-currency FX swap (if negative) (if Net positions vis-à-vis non-banks is positive). The first three columns report results from OLS 
regressions. The next three columns are from fixed effect regressions.  Fixed effect coefficients not reported. The final two columns 
introduce a dummy variable, Vienna, indicating source countries involved in the Vienna initiative. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 33 
 
Table 6. Local claims lending growth in emerging markets 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  OLS  OLS  OLS FE  FE  FE  OLS FE 
               
 
 
i D   
proxy 
V1  -0.291***     -0.206         
   (0.111)     (0.126)        
V2    -0.364***     -0.271*   -0.256  -0.269 
    (0.126)     (0.147)   (0.166)  (0.189) 
V3      -1.184*** 
(0.347) 
   -1.050*** 
(0.384) 
   
Vienna            -0.865**  -0.927**
            (0.404)  (0.420) 
V2.Vienna            3.304***  3.070***
            (1.090)  (1.131) 
Constant     0.674***      0.675***    0.636***       0.529***   
  (0.120)  (0.111)  (0.0889)       (0.170)   
               
Observations  267  267  267 245  245 245  267  245 
R-squared  0.025  0.030  0.042 0.395  0.397 0.409  0.073  0.421 
 
The measures of ex-ante dollar vulnerability are calculated using country-specific gross and net US Dollar aggregates. The 
definitions of the three measures are as follows. V1: Liabilities to official monetary authorities + International liabilities to non-
banks + Local liabilities to US residents booked by US offices + Liabilities to banks + cross-currency FX swap (if negative); V2: 
Liabilities to official monetary authorities + International liabilities to non-banks + Local liabilities to US residents booked by US 
offices + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency FX swap (if negative); V3 either : Liabilities to official monetary authorities + 
Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency FX swap (if negative) + Net positions vis-à-vis non-banks (if negative), or Liabilities to 
official monetary authorities + Net Liabilities to banks  + cross-currency FX swap (if negative) (if Net positions vis-à-vis non-banks 
is positive). The first three columns report results from OLS regressions. The next three columns are from fixed effect regressions.  
The final two columns introduce a dummy variable, Vienna, indicating source countries involved in the Vienna initiative. Fixed 
effect coefficients not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7 Quantitative significance of ex ante vulnerability on lending 
 
  Cross-Border Lending  Local Lending  


















Germany  9,233 -8.02%  5,136  -6.88% 
Spain  1,454  -18.26 %  14,417  -15.66% 
United 
Kingdom  3,644 -28.44%  8,547  -24.39% 
 
The Post-Pre % change figures are obtained using the values of V2 for the three countries, as reported in the bottom 
panel of Table 3B, and the estimated coefficients of the V2 variable from column (5) regressions in table 5 (for Cross-
Border Lending) and 6 (for Local Lending).  
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Table 8 Robustness Test Details 
 
Panel A. Correlations among Country Control Variables 
 
 pcrdbgdp  overhead  roa  roe  zscore  offdep  cap  lintclaims v2_adj 
pcrdbgdp  1 . 0 0 0           
overhead  0.040  1.000         
roa  0.304  0.417  1.000        
roe  0.107  -0.168  0.608  1.0000       
zscore  0.212  -0.555  -0.340  -0.202  1.000      
offdep  0.347  -0.174  -0.079  0.149  0.090  1.000     
cap  0.271 0.695 0.812 0.068 -0.231  -0.155 1.000     
lintclaims  -0.262 0.605 -0.112 -0.501 -0.318 -0.097 0.195 1.000   
V2  -0.138 0.183 0.185 0.189 -0.464  -0.324 0.078 0.027 1.000 
 
Panel B.   Regression Coefficients on V2 in specifications that control for banking variables 
 pcrdbgdp  overhead  roa  roe  zscore  offdep  cap  lintclaims All  bank 
variables 
           
X-border  -0.315*** -0.303*** -0.313*** -0.320*** -0.362*** -0.290*** -0.312*** -0.314*** -0.336***
  (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.077) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.091) 
           
Local   -0.269* -0.271* -0.267* -0.272*  -0.208 -0.280*  -0.264* -0.246  -0.367 
  (0.148) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.161) (0.154) (0.146) (0.149) (0.259) 
 
The source-country controls are defined as follows: pcrdbgdp is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP; overhead is accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share of its total assets; roa is net bank income 
over total bank assets; roe is net bank income over total equity; zscore is (roa+equity/assets)/standard deviation(ROA; offdep is 
offshore bank deposits relative to domestic deposits; cap is equity to asset ratio; lintclaims is the log of total international claims. 
The estimated coefficients in Panel B are those of the V2 measure in fixed effects regressions including the country control(s) listed 

















































































The charts depict quarterly averages of log cross-border and local lending for source countries with low or high V2. 
Figures on the vertical axis are rescaled so that they are both equal to zero at time zero. Time zero is 2007q2.  36 
 
Table 10 Domestic Lending Supply Growth Shock 
 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
High V2 share in   -0.370***    -0.348**  -0.453*** 
cross border (H)  (0.135)    (0.135)  (0.160) 
Cross border     0.431*  0.311  -0.174 
share in funding (X)    (0.243)  (0.238)  (0.467) 
(H)·(X)      0.818 
      (0.678) 
Constant  0.654***  0.370***  0.610***  0.677*** 
  (0.093)  (0.044)  (0.098)  (0.112) 
      
Observations 58 58 58 58 
R-squared  0.118 0.050 0.145 0.167 
 
The dependent variable is domestic bank lending growth pre-post crisis for each emerging market country. Lending in the “pre” crisis 
period is defined as the time average between 2006q2 and 2007q2. Lending in the “post” crisis period is defined as the time average 
between 2008q3 and 2009q2. High V2 share in cross border is the share of cross border interbank funding obtained from source 
countries with V2 values above the median value across source countries. Cross-border share in funding is the ratio of total cross-






Source for Charts 1 and 2: BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Bank Loans (Table 7c), Net Bond Issues (Table 11); 
Foreign Direct Investment from the Global Development Fund; Portfolio equity data from CEIC; also Federal 
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Appendix Table 1. Sample of Developing Countries 
Latin America (30)  Emerging Europe (21)  Emerging Asia (43) 
Argentina  Albania Afghanistan  Solomon  Islands 
Belize  Belarus Armenia  South  Korea 
Bolivia  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Azerbaijan  Sri Lanka 
Brazil  Bulgaria Bangladesh  Taiwan 
Chile  Crotia Bhutan  Tajikistan 
Colombia  Cyprus Brunei  Thailand 
Costa Rica  Czech Republic  Cambodia  Timor Leste 
Cuba  Estonia China  Tonga 
Dominica  Hungary Fiji  Turkmenistan 
Dominican Republic  Latvia French  Polynesia  Uzbekistan 
Ecuador  Lithuania Georgia  Vietnam 
El Salvador  Macedonia  India  Wallis and Futuna 
Falkland Islands  Malta Indonesia  Western  Samoa 
Grenada  Moldova Kazakhstan   
Guatemala  Poland Kiribati   
Guyana  Romania Kyrgyz  Republic   
Haiti  Russia Laos  
Honduras  Slovakia Malaysia   
Jamaica  Slovenia Maldives   
Mexico  Turkey Marshall  Islands   
Nicaragua  Ukraine Micronesia   
Paraguay   Mongolia   
Peru   Myanmar   
St. Lucia   Nauru   
St. Vincent   Nepal   
Suriname   New  Caledonia   
Trinidad and Tobago   North  Korea   
Turks and Caicos   Pakistan   
Uruguay    Papau New Guinea   
Venezuela   Philippines   39 
 
Appendix Table 2  Delivery on EIB’s Commitments under the Joint IFI Action Plan  
 
By Institution up to end-September 2009 (Euro millions) 
Bank Available  Disbursed  2009  pipeline  Total 
UniCredit Group (Italy)  951 204 75 1,230
Erste Bank Group (Austria)  446 280 0 726
Société Générale (France)  393 59 40 492
Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy)  265 139 50 454
Dexia Group (Belgium)  226 117 100 443
Bayern LB (Germany  242 100 100 442
EFG Eurobank (Greece)  315 35 0 350
BNP Paribas / Fortis (France)  300 30 0 330
RZB (Austria)  230 8 40 278
KBC Group (Belgium)  110 63 100 273
Total  3,478 1,035 505 5,018
Other Banks  4,051 682 1,005 5,738
Grand Total   7,529 1,717 1,510 10,756
 
By Country up to end-September 2009 (Euro millions) 
Country Available  Disbursed  2009  pipeline  Total 
Bulgaria  169 25 60 254
Czech Republic  591 269 0 860
Estonia  25 50 0 75
Hungary  679 409 0 1,088
Latvia  115 30 145 290
Lithuania  25 23 0 48
Poland  1,023 211 275 1,509
Romania  424 65 50 539
Slovakia  260 22 100 382
Slovenia  709 40 100 849
Total EU – 10  4,019 1,144 730 5,893
Albania  0 0 20 20
Bosnia Herzegovina  291 37 120 449
Croatia  540 34 40 613
FYROM  110 0 0 110
Montenegro  132 0 0 132
Serbia  583 44 100 727
Total Western Balkans  1,655 115 280 2,050
Total Turkey  1,855 459 500 2,813
Total  7,529 1,717 1,510 10,756
 
“Progress Report on the Joint IFI Action Plan,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
European Investment Bank Group, and World Bank Group, October 2009, pp. 14-15. 
 
 